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The size and growth of the local public sector in democratic, multi-tiered structures of 
government are the outcomes of the decentralized political process, subject to the fiscal 
rules set by upper – typically, national and state in unitary and federal countries 
respectively – tiers of government. Quite frequently, besides establishing local 
governments’ domain of competencies, own revenue sources or even the conditions for the 
very existence of municipal/county tiers (a manifestation of the so-called Dillon’s rule in 
the US local government system, and the de jure or de facto status of local governments in 
most European countries) those rules contain a number of limitations and obligations that 
considerably restrict the actual fiscal autonomy of local governments. 
Importantly, and partly as a result of the financial crisis of the late 2000s as discussed 
below, those restrictive fiscal institutions have been playing an increasing role across the 
developed world in the most recent years. This chapter focuses in particular on the genesis 
and consequences of tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) on local governments (multi-
purpose authorities as municipalities, counties or provinces, as well as one-purpose 
districts), offering a comparison of this sort of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements in the 
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amply studied and debated US case, and across some relevant experiences in the countries 
of Europe that are virtually ignored in academic research. While I focus on specifically 
local TELs, a related literature deals explicitly with the analysis of the effectiveness and 
consequences of state TELs on the expenditures and revenues of US states (Mullins and 
Wallin, 2004; Kousser et al., 2008; Bae et al., 2012). 
Within the US federal system, the genesis and consequences of local TELs have attracted 
and continue to attract considerable attention within the public economics literature, as 
discussed below. Much less studied are the features and consequences of fiscal limitations 
on local governments in Europe. Given that several reviews of the US literature have 
appeared in the past few years, this chapter focuses on the most recent and innovative 
theoretical and empirical contributions in this area, as well as on the few investigations of 
the European experiences. In fact, far from being a US-specific fiscal institution, local tax 
rate limitations are observed almost everywhere across the developed world. In Europe, 
local tax limitations are in place in virtually all countries, most frequently including the 
main sources of own revenue of local governments – property, business, income, and 
consumption taxes – as well as restrictions on the level of surcharges that local 
governments are allowed to set on upper levels of government’s tax levies (usually personal 
or business income). As documented by Joumard and Kongsrud (2003) and Sutherland et 
al. (2005), TELs are frequently so tight and pervasive across the developed world and 
Europe in particular as to jeopardize the very principle of local government fiscal 
autonomy. A frequently encountered case is a cap on a local tax rate, though several forms 
of fiscal limitations exist including lower tax rate bounds, admissible annual public 
spending increases, or local public deficit/debt targets. 
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 first categorizes the observed 
restrictive fiscal institutions into three main forms (bottom-up, top-down, and self-imposed) 
according to the nature of the process (participatory, hierarchical or self-disciplining) by 
which they were originated. Section 3 reviews the theoretical explanations for the existence 
of TELs in well-developed democratic systems, focusing on the most recent original 
contributions. Section 4 discusses the recent evidence on the impact of TELs on various 
aspects of decentralized fiscal policy-making. Finally, section 5 outlines potential avenues 
for further applied research, and offers some concluding considerations on the foreseeable 
role of restrictive fiscal institutions in multi-tiered structures of government in an era of 
fiscal consolidation. 
 
2. A categorization of local TELs 
2.1 Bottom-up TELs 
Tax and expenditure limitations on local policy-making authorities are frequently 
encountered in multi-tiered structures of government. The observed restrictive fiscal 
institutions can be categorized into three main forms (bottom-up, top-down and self-
imposed) according to the nature of the process (participatory, hierarchical, or self-
disciplining) by which they were originated. In particular, an explicit, quantitative 
restriction on a local government’s ability to raise taxes and/or spend on public services – 
be it expressed in terms of statutory tax rate bounds, tax base assessment rules (e.g., 
admissible property value yearly assessment increase for taxable purposes), per capita levy 
or aggregate expenditure level and growth limits – is defined here as bottom-up if it shares 
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the following two features. First, the fiscal limitation measure can be interpreted as the 
direct or indirect result of some form of popular movement or initiative to limit the overall 
size of local government and/or alter its tax revenue mix. It is bottom-up in the sense that it 
spreads from taxpayers and public service users – variously organized in associations, 
interest groups, lobbies – onto some elected officials’ legislative action. Second, such 
popularly demanded limits on local governments (where local can refer to municipalities, 
counties, regions or special purpose districts, depending on the specific institutional 
arrangements) are not enacted, enforced and tailored to the level of government on which 
they eventually apply – as in self-imposed limits discussed in section 2.3 below – but are 
delegated to an higher level of government (typically the states in federal countries) than 
the local units they bind. Finally, such limits are uniformly applied by that upper tier 
authority across its entire jurisdiction. This way, it is a transfer from below of the power to 
limit. 
As such, the above definition seems to encompass most of the experiences of state 
limitation of local government fiscal policy that have emerged in the US states during the 
20th century, namely: a) fiscal limitations that are the explicit outcomes of voter-initiated 
ballots, as 1978 Proposition 13 in California; b) fiscal limitations passed or put out to 
referenda by legislators in states with the initiative process in order to anticipate or prevent 
voter-initiated actions (often as a result of initiative events sub a) above having occurred 
elsewhere in the country); c) fiscal limitations that legislators, even in the absence of formal 
popular initiative processes and direct access to the ballot in the state, have passed in order 
to avoid retribution at elections (again likely under the influence of manifestations of a) and 
b) in other, likely related or nearby, states). 
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Some of the existing restrictive arrangements in the US system of local government 
(particularly property tax limits) date back as early as the 1930s, while they became 
widespread after California’s Proposition 13. As many as 43 US states implemented some 
kind of property tax limitation within two years of the passage of Proposition 13 (Mullins 
and Wallin, 2004). Shedbagian (1998) documents that, prior to 1970, only four states 
(Alrizona, Colorado, Oregon, and Utah) imposed potentially binding limits on local 
governments’ taxing and spending powers. More recently, a large number of US state TELs 
adoption took place during the 1980s and 1990s: from 1970 to 1992, 26 additional states 
imposed TELs, and currently 46 US states have some form of local TELs. 
The vast US literature in this area lists up to seven distinct forms that limits can take: 1) 
general revenue increases; 2) general expenditure increases; 3) assessment increase limits; 
4) property tax levy limit; 5) overall property tax rate limitation; 6) specific property (or 
other) rate limit; 7) full disclosure, in terms of specific requirements on public discussion or 
legislative voting procedure prior to the enactment of tax rate (levy) increases. 
An important distinction as far as the effectiveness of limits is concerned is on whether 
limits are ‘nonbinding’ or ‘potentially binding.’ The former case refers to limits that can be 
circumvented through alterations in the tax structure parameters that are not explicitly 
involved in the limitation. A typical example is an attempt to limit property tax levies 
through caps on statutory tax rates: in fact, the rate limit is substantively nonbinding if it is 
not coupled with a limit on property tax base assessment increases. General revenue or 
general expenditure limits are instead potentially binding due to the fixed and universal 
nature of the constraint, though the extent to which they actually limit spending or revenue 
growth for governments at the bound-generated corner solution – or the counterfactual 
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budget growth if the limit had not been imposed – is of course unobserved. On the other 
hand, even governments that are observed to set expenditures or revenues strictly below the 
upper limits might in fact be constrained by them – say if the limit forced the government 
to renounce to implementation of a bulky new expenditure program. 
Whatever their specific form, though, all bottom-up TELs share the feature of having one 
upper authority – most commonly the state legislature in the US – being transferred from 
local taxpayers the power to set uniform limits on local governments within its jurisdiction. 
Possible explanations for this centripetal movement of fiscal regulatory power are 
discussed in section 3 below. 
 
2.2 Top-down TELs 
Unlike the US, typical arrangements among European countries have national governments 
unilaterally setting limits on the fiscal policies - taxes, expenditures or budget deficits - of 
regional and local governments. The lack of bottom-up processes can be largely explained 
by the fact that citizen-initiated proposals in fiscal matters are constitutionally ruled out in 
most European countries. 
Interestingly, the historical tendency of central governments across Europe to have 
preeminence and exercise a tight control on local governments – a sort of Europe-wide 
Dillon’s rule that might seem in contradiction with the European Charter of Local Self-
Government approved by the member states of the Council of Europe (1985) - has become 
even more pronounced in recent years. First, adherence to the Maastricht Treaty and the 
Growth and Stability Pact implied that member countries had to impose an increasing 
degree of fiscal discipline on all domestic levels of government during the 1990s in order to 
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match the EU deficit and debt targets, often formally establishing the budgeting rules and 
criteria that lower levels of governments had to abide to. Second, the financial crisis of 
2007-2008 constituted a tremendous centripetal force in Europe, both in terms of the 
weakening of EU member state sovereignty over fiscal matters, and of the dwindling of the 
fiscal autonomy that regional and local governments had progressively achieved. 
Surprisingly enough, and in spite of those two waves of centralization of fiscal rules, TELs 
on local governments in EU countries have attracted very little attention, particularly if one 
considers that local government fiscal autonomy is severely restricted, and increasingly so, 
across virtually all main European countries. 
Interestingly, and unlike what may seem the very spirit of the US tax revolt movement, it is 
not uncommon to see national governments in Europe set minimum along with maximum 
tax rates that local governments can set, or even establish tax rate or specific public 
spending floors only, understandably to prevent the excesses of potentially harmful 
competition among localities in a ‘race to the bottom.’ 
An example in this latter respect is Germany, a federal country with a rather involved and 
fragmented local government structure. The by far most important source of revenue for the 
over 12,000 German municipalities – the local business tax, or trade tax (Gewerbesteuer) – 
is subject to a lower bound only, and an homogeneous one through the whole national 
territory, irrespective of the state municipalities are located into. Municipalities are allowed 
to apply a so-called ‘multiplier’ on a federally set basic business tax rate. The basic federal 
rate was brought down from 5% to 3.5% of the tax base in the 2008 reform of business 
taxation that also cut the corporate income tax rate from 25% to 15%. Municipalities can 
then apply a multiplier that cannot be lower than 200%, while having no upper limitation. 
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The municipal multiplier takes an average value of around 400%, amounting to an overall 
joint municipal-federal tax rate of 14% on business income (a sort of value added tax base, 
measured at the plant level), with larger urban areas typically setting higher multipliers 
(exceeding 500% in some instances) than smaller rural localities (Fossen and Bach, 2008). 
Most other European experiences of local tax limitations have either upper limits only 
(‘caps’), or both lower and upper limits. As an instance of the former, the UK system of 
local government represents an interesting case of study in many respects. First, a large 
share of total public expenditures is wielded by UK local governments (about one quarter in 
the early 2010s, including counties, districts and one-purpose authorities), and this has been 
accompanied by a secular experience in the application of the property tax as the single 
local tax, from the ‘rates’ (a proportional tax on business property and domestic 
hereditaments) to the Council tax. The Council tax, introduced in the early 1990s to replace 
the short-lived Community Charge (or Poll Tax), constitutes the major source of financing 
of local governments. While British local authorities enjoy in principle the power to set the 
Council tax at the level they wish, the only formal constraint being a quasi-proportional 
schedule obtained via a system of property value bands, the central government retains the 
power to discretionarily cap local property taxes according to rules that have been changing 
over time depending on the party in power at the national level (usually Conservative 
governments putting tougher constraints than Labour ones). Moreover, on the expenditure 
side, national government agencies set standards and rules on local authorities’ outlays on 
public services, including recurrent mandating of standard service provision and a 
sophisticated system of evaluation of local government performance in the provision of key 
public services as health, education and social care. 
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In France, a traditionally highly centralized country whose Napoleonic model of 
administration was exported to several continental countries during the early 19th century, 
all major local taxes have been subjected to pretty involved limitation schemes. Such 
centralized control survived the decentralization reform of the 1980s that gave local 
governments pretty substantial own sources of tax revenues (chiefly the taxes on land, 
buildings and business assets). However, the fiscal counter-reformation of the latest 
Sarkozy years somewhat diluted the fiscal decentralization revolution of the Mitterrand era: 
most notably, the local business tax (taxe professionelle), previously limited to 3.5% of 
business value added, was abolished altogether starting January 1, 2010, in an effort to 
unleash entrepreneurial activity and promote investment, growth and employment 
(Ministère de l’Economie, de l’Industrie et de l’Emploi, République Francaise: Loi des 
Finances, 2010), yet depriving the around 36,000 French municipalities and their inter-
municipal cooperation and upper-tier departmental structures of one of the most important 
sources of own tax revenue. The remaining municipal taxes on land and property (Taxe 
d’Habitation and Taxe Foncière) keep on being subjected to strict central limits on the tax 
rates. 
In Spain, a quasi-federal country, the regional governments (Comunidades autónomas) 
gained a large share of competencies and financial resources since their creation in 1981, 
and, following the 1992 reform (Segundos Pactos Autonómicos), accounted in the late 
2000s for over a third of public spending and enjoyed substantial tax autonomy. However, 
the doubling of their debts during the financial crisis of 2007-2009, with large autonomous 
communities like Catalonia systematically overshooting their deficit targets, induced 
central government to impose quarterly budget reporting in 2011, and to assume the right to 
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directly intervene in communities’ fiscal policies in case of non-compliance with centrally 
set fiscal discipline rules -- an altogether centralization of the regional tax autonomy 
(Gobierno de Espana, Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Publicas, Ley Organica 
de Estabilidad Presupuestaria, 2012). As far as local government is concerned, Spanish 
municipal authorities (Ayuntamientos) mainly rely on property taxes, vehicle registration 
taxes and a tax on the increase in value of urban land, whose parameters they can set within 
the limits set by central government. In particular, the local property tax (IBI, Impuesto 
sobre Bienes Inmuebles), the most important source of revenue for municipal governments, 
is subject to lower and upper rate limits of 0.4% and 1.3% of the cadastral value of the 
property (0.3% and 0.9% as far as rural buildings are concerned). 
In Italy, while the fiscal decentralization reforms of the 1990s granted significant sources of 
own revenues to regions and local governments (municipalities and provinces), the state 
kept on imposing limits on the rates that those authorities could set. In particular, the 
regions are subject to statutory tax rate limitations for their own revenues: the regional 
business tax rate can be increased or decreased by one percentage point relative to the 
nationally set standard rate (4.25% on business income measured as plant level value 
added; the national baseline rate was reduced to 3.90% in 2008, leaving regions the faculty 
to change it by 0.92 percentage points). As far as the regional personal income surcharge is 
concerned – a proportional surtax on the national progressive personal income tax, and the 
second most important regional revenue source – regions can set a rate between 0.9% and 
1.4% of taxable income. The state retains the power to mandate increases in regional taxes 
to the maximum rates for regions exhibiting budget deficits (Revelli, 2012). 
As for local governments, there is a two-tier system: provinces and municipalities. All 
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provincial revenue sources are subject to lower an upper rate limitations as discussed in 
detail in Revelli (2010). The recently reformed municipal property tax (IMU, Imposta 
Municipale) leaves municipalities the possibility of setting rates within minimum and 
maximum levels being set nationally. The rate limits amount to a minimum of 0.46% 
(reduced to 0.2% for owner-occupied dwellings) and a maximum of 1.06% (0.6% for 
owner-occupied dwellings) of the cadastral value of the property. Similarly to regions, 
municipalities can also apply a surtax on the national personal income tax: the municipal 
personal income surcharge rate cannot exceed 0.5% (raised to 0.8% in 2007) of the 
personal income tax base. As for public expenditures, the domestic stability pact (DSP) has 
over the years put very strict limits on the path of current and capital outlays, as well as 
allowed municipal budget deficits, depending on the annual financial law. 
Whether property or business taxes are concerned, the European experience in terms of 
national limitation of local governments reveals that those limits are present in virtually all 
countries. In particular, Fossen and Bach (2008) report that both unitary and federal 
countries – from Portugal to Switzerland – have in place severe limitations on the ability of 
local governments to tax business, and those limitations are found to most frequently 
involve property and, where existent, local income taxes too. Therefore, it definitely seems 
that, in spite of the lack of ‘institutional’ information that frequently plagues research on 
local government finance, any attempt to model the behavior of decentralized units in 
European countries ought to consider that the observed taxation and public spending 
outcomes are likely to be the result of a constrained optimization process that might 
actually represent a corner solution at a state-imposed limit. 
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2.3 Self-imposed TELs 
A recently explored issue is the possibility that a limit be imposed by a local government 
on its own ability to tax and spend, even in the absence of mandates to do so by upper tiers 
of government. Brooks et al. (2012) are the first to systematically tackle that issue from a 
theoretical and empirical point of view. They define self-imposed local TELs as laws 
appearing in the code or charter of a municipality – the equivalent of a (fiscal) constitution 
in the Brennan and Buchanan (1980) sense – that explicitly: a) establish ceilings for total 
municipal revenues or outlays; b) cap the overall rate or total revenue generated from a 
given tax or fee; c) require a referendum to raise an existing tax or fee. 
To examine whether this sort of self-imposed local TELs exist at all in US municipalities, 
Brooks et al. (2012) conducted a survey of 347 municipalities (including all 247 cities with 
populations of 100,000 or more and a random sample of 100 cities with populations 
between 25,000 and 100,000, accounting for over a quarter of the total US population) 
finding that over 1 in 8 municipalities had an own limit according to the above definition. 
Their survey showed that those self-imposed limits were generally more restrictive than 
state-imposed TELs where states imposed fiscal limitations at all, and that they frequently 
referred to own revenue sources that were not involved by state-imposed TELs. Moreover, 
many of the self-imposed local TELs had been enacted prior to the tax-revolt following the 
approval of Proposition 13 in California: half of them were adopted before 1980, with some 
having been in existence for several decades. Over two-thirds of the local TELs emerging 
from the survey are written into municipal charters, the rest appearing in municipal codes, 
and were introduced via city council action or citizen-initiated ballot measure. In most 
instances, limits cannot be circumvented or repealed by city council action alone, but 
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require supermajorities or referenda, and in around half of the cities the self-imposed limits 
are actually binding. In particular, over half of the self-imposed TELs identified by Brooks 
et al. (2012) – that are existing in 40 of the sampled cities – involve the property tax in 
terms of rate, levy and assessment limits, the latter being usually expressed as an allowable 
annual percentage increase in assessed property value. A number of cities have general 
revenue or expenditure limits, again typically expressed as an annual allowable percentage 
increase, as well as sales tax limits capping the rate or restricting the number of taxable 
items, income tax limits, and user fees limitations. 
When investigating the determinants of self-adoption of TELs, Brooks et al. (2012) find 
that a number of state and municipal institutions can explain the introduction of TELs. 
First, based on the distinction between ‘general law’ (the majority of US cities located in 
Dillon’s rule states, only holding the power expressly given to them by the states) and 
‘home rule’ (enjoying a larger degree of autonomy in own institutional design, including 
fiscal matters), they find that the latter are significantly more likely to set themselves tax 
limits. Similarly, self-limitations are more likely to appear in cities where voters have 
access to citizen-initiated legislation through referendum, while the city form of 
government does not appear to play a role. Finally and interestingly, the structure of the 
metropolitan area in terms of number of municipalities appears an important factor 
explaining the decision to adopt a limit: the larger the number of local governmental units, 
the stronger the market-like competition constraints on local officials arising from 
households’ and businesses’ migration threats, and the less urgent the need to explicitly tie 
tax-setting authorities’ hands. 
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3. The rationale for TELs 
The early theoretical investigations of the emergence of TELs focused on the imperfections 
of the political representation process and on the inability of taxpayers to effectively 
monitor and control the growth of the public sector due to insurmountable information 
asymmetry and agency problems. If the political outcome does not reflect the demand of 
the median voter due to supply-side malfunctioning (budget-maximizing bureaucrats, 
monopoly power, agenda setting, logrolling, interest group prevalence), direct participation 
and involvement of the citizenry in the decision-making progress by way of initiatives and 
referenda aimed at limiting governments might be the appropriate response. Backed by the 
well-known Brennan and Buchanan (1980) fiscal constitution arguments, formal limitations 
on representatives’ power to tax would be the only way to effectively constrain excessive 
taxes and wasteful expenditures by Leviathan governments. In addition, TELs might be an 
optimal response in the presence of changes in the underlying environment due to demand-
side considerations: because the political process is slow and sluggish, voters may find it 
beneficial to support a TEL to ensure that change occurs when is needed, particularly in the 
presence of an increase in the effective tax price of local public services that might be 
determined by state and federal retrenchment in (matching) grant policy and local tax 
deductibility provisions on federal income tax returns – phenomena that occurred in the US 
over the 1970s and 1980s (Alm and Skidmore, 1999). Moreover, periods of high income 
growth, demographic change and alterations in the distribution of income at the local level 
would make the passage of TELs more likely. 
However, those early explanations could not explain a typical feature that TELs have taken 
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in federal countries as the US, mainly the fact that voters would systematically choose to 
delegate to state governments – a further away and harder to control tier of government – 
the power to restrain their own autonomy in managing local public service provision and 
financing. It seems hard to explain why local tax and spending constraining initiatives 
would be adopted and applied statewide, irrespective of the possibly highly heterogeneous 
preferences of taxpayers in individual localities. If the true reason for voter-initiated TELs 
was the inconsistency of the size and scope of local government with their respective 
constituencies’ wills and preferences, a much better and more effective means to influence 
or restrain local government would seem to propose local initiatives and limit property or 
other taxes in a local vote, where the community median voter would be more likely to 
prevail. Moreover, the local level of government seems the level that is most easily 
influenced and controlled by the citizenry, and is conventionally believed to be the most 
responsive to citizens’ needs, also due to the threat of household mobility and business 
relocation. 
In fact, Fischel (1989) put forward the argument that the California Supreme Court’s 
decision Serrano vs. Priest caused the tax revolt culminated in Proposition 13 by breaking 
the prevailing Tiebout-Hamilton equilibrium and divorcing local property wealth from 
school expenditures: by shifting the education finance burden and equalization to the state, 
wealthy communities would lose their fiscal advantages and would no longer view the 
property tax as a fee for public school services (but rather as a deadweight loss to them), 
and vote for Proposition 13 after the court decision. A weakness of the Fischel (1989) 
theory, though, is its inability to explain a wide range of tax limitation initiatives in 
different states. 
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More recent contributions have in fact argued that the very existence of fiscal limitations on 
decentralized governments in multi-tiered structures is a phenomenon that is hard to 
conceive in terms of the traditional view of decentralized democratic processes as 
accountability-enhancing mechanisms, and even labeled local TELs as a sort of anomaly 
(Calabrese and Epple, 2010) or theoretical puzzle (Vigdor, 2004). Nechyba (1997) was 
among the first to formally tackle the general issue of the genesis of tax limits in multi-
tiered government structures, and tried to explain the observed tax structure (income tax at 
the state level, property tax at the local level) as a response to a sort of coordination failure. 
He argued that state command on local fiscal choices (in terms of income tax-funded grants 
and state-imposed caps on local property tax rates) would arise in equilibrium as an optimal 
outside enforcement when a collusive agreement to simultaneously introduce local income 
taxes is not self-enforcing. On the other hand, in a later contribution Vigdor (2004) put 
forward the argument that statewide local tax limitations could be seen as a way for voters 
in a jurisdiction to influence tax and expenditure decisions in other jurisdictions. Voters 
might have preferences for tax policy in other jurisdictions either because they own renter-
occupied housing and nonresidential land and structures there (absentee landowners), or 
because they work in other jurisdictions (nonresident employees) and expect to earn higher 
wages with lower taxes on structures and capital that raise the marginal product of labor. In 
addition, support for tax limits might come from ‘marginal residents,’ or individuals who 
would relocate to another jurisdiction in the presence of a discrete change in the tax and 
expenditure mix there. Interestingly, based on data from Massachusetts, Vigdor (2004) 
found that support for Proposition 2 and 1/2 was higher among voters who lived near, 
rather than in, high-tax localities, thus corroborating his marginal resident hypothesis. 
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Finally, Calabrese and Epple (2010) recently provided a comprehensive political economy 
model of the emergence of tax limits in the presence of multiple local policy instruments: a 
proportional income tax that might or not be allowed by state legislation, an ad valorem 
property tax, spending on a local public good, and a lump sum individual transfer serving 
the role of redistribution instrument. In particular, and similarly to Vigdor (2004), 
Calabrese and Epple (2010) find that a set of voters support tax limitations because of their 
desire to move out of their jurisdiction once the limit is adopted statewide. However, they 
also show that a second group of voters supports tax limits because they alleviate the 
distortionary effects of high taxes in central-city. Overall, they conclude that while a large 
proportion of the population would gain from the imposition of tax limits and therefore 
vote for them, the welfare of the lowest-income households is reduced as a consequence of 
the fall in local expenditures on redistribution – an adverse welfare effect that might be 
offset, though, by a modest increase in redistribution spending at the state level. 
Clearly, given the diversity of existing fiscal limitation arrangements across the globe, and 
the relative thinness of the theoretical research on the foundations and explanations of those 
limits, it seems that theoretical research in this area could foster our understanding of a 
phenomenon that stays at the core of actual fiscal federalism structures. 
 
4. The consequences of tax limits 
Unlike the theoretical literature on the causes of tax and expenditure limitations, the 
empirical literature on the effects of TELs on various aspects of local public finance and 
service delivery and quality is enormous, and has recently been reviewed elsewhere (e.g., 
 19 
Anderson, 2006; Yuan et al., 2007; Sun, 2013). Consequently, I will only briefly report the 
main results of the empirical research of the recent decades in section 4.1 below, and 
devote sections 4.2 and 4.3 to a deeper discussion of recent, original investigations of the 
consequences of tax limits on two specific and crucial aspects of the behavior of local 
officials: the sensitivity of local public spending to grants and the degree of fiscal 
competition among local authorities. 
 
4.1 Do limits work? Intended and unintended consequences of TELs 
The evidence with respect to whether TELs are an effective instrument to constrain elected 
officials or whether they become dead letters relies almost entirely on US state and local 
government data, and is sort of mixed. The early empirical analysis based on US state panel 
data 1972-1992 by Shadbegian (1998) concluded that TELs had been successful in 
reducing both the size and growth of local government over those two decades, and that 
they reduced the reliance on property taxes. In particular, Shadbegian (1998) relied on the 
distinction between potentially binding limits – i.e., explicit and fixed ceilings on property 
tax levy, expenditure, and revenue increases – and nonbinding ones – i.e., plain tax rate 
limits that can be circumvented by tax base (usually property) assessment increases – and 
focused on the former by building a dummy variable equal to one for a given state in a 
given year if any of those potentially binding limits was in place. While this approach tends 
to overlook the specific features of state TELs rules, Shadbegian (1998) did allow for the 
possibility of TELs adoption endogeneity. 
Subsequent analyses have performed finer analyses of the differential impact of TELs 
based on their specific characteristics, and looked at their effects on local revenue structure, 
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spending composition, public service outcomes, interpersonal distribution, and tax base 
growth. In their review, Yuan et al. (2007) confirm that property tax rate limits that are 
coupled with assessment limits (potentially binding limits) resulted in the greatest reduction 
in the growth of per capita property tax revenue, but also show that local governments have 
reacted to such constraints by relying more heavily on other own sources of revenue such 
as charges and fees, as also found by Shadbegian (1999) and later by Kousser et al. (2008), 
who test for the effectiveness of state TELs across US states using a difference-in-
differences approach and allowing for heterogeneous effects depending on the legal 
provision of the limits. They find that TELs are largely ineffective in limiting state 
spending growth since officials can circumvent those limits by raising money through fees 
or push fiscal burdens down to lower levels. 
As far as their impact on public spending composition and service provision are concerned, 
Poterba and Rueben (1995) investigated the effects of TELs on wages and employment in 
the public sector, and did find a negative correlation between limits and wage and 
employment growth, though they warned from attributing a causal interpretation to the 
effect given that voter taste for government growth might affect both local public sector 
labor market outcomes and the enactment of property tax limits. 
Most of the subsequent research focused on education outcomes in US school districts, 
with mixed outcomes in terms of the degree to which student performance in districts 
subject to tax limitations falls relative to student performance in districts not subject to tax 
limitations (Figlio, 1997; Downes et al., 1998; Shadbegian, 2003). Much of that research is 
reviewed in Yuan et al. (2007). As for the financial market consequences of tax limits, 
Poterba and Rueben (1999) find that state fiscal institutions affect the required return that 
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lenders demand when states enter the market for tax-exempt bonds. They estimate that a 
state with a binding tax limitation statute will face, on average, a borrowing rate between 
15 and 20 basis points higher than a state without a tax limitation law. 
Finally, some research has focused on the effects of property tax limits on property values 
in US localities. Bradbury et al. (2001) examine the impact of Proposition 2 and 1/2 in 
Massachusetts – a cap of 2.5% on the property tax rate and a limit of 2.5% on nominal 
annual growth in municipal property tax revenues that were enacted in 1980. They rely on 
the hypothesis of capitalization of spending (particularly local spending on education) in 
house prices, and on the argument that such tax limitation might introduce a possible source 
of discrepancy between the actual spending outcomes of communities and what the median 
voter, marginal homebuyer, or local public officials might select if unconstrained. Bradbury 
et al. (2001) exploit the fact that Proposition 2 and 1/2 did not bind all communities in the 
same way, but that some were forced to cut their property taxes over the 1980s, and some 
were able to override the constraints through referenda, while other were not. Their 
empirical findings suggest that Proposition 2 and 1/2 significantly reduced school spending, 
and that constrained communities that were able to increase school spending despite the 
limitation realized gains in property values, consistent with the view that potential home 
purchasers considered the attraction of increases in school spending to outweigh the costs 
of increased taxes to pay for them. Hilber and Mayer (2009) extend Bradbury et al. (2001) 
analysis by introducing a proxy for the extent of capitalization (the supply of land available 
for new development) and show that the presence of little undeveloped land leads to larger 
capitalization into house prices in response to limit-driven spending changes. Moreover 
they show the persistence of the correlation between housing prices and school spending 
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using a larger sample of school districts from 46 US states. Most recently, Hoyt et al. 
(2011) examine the impact of tax and expenditure limits on housing prices and growth 
using US state panel data. Their findings indicate that property tax limits as well as general 
revenue limits push housing prices up. On the other hand, limits on educational spending 
reduce housing prices, suggesting that it is the relative impact of limits on property levies 
and expenditures on valuable public services that ultimately determines the impact on 
housing prices. As for the housing stock, property, revenue and expenditure limits are 
found to have ambiguous effects. 
 
4.2 Tax limits and the sensitivity of public expenditures to grants 
While a vast literature (recently reviewed by Inman, 2009) has investigated and sought to 
explain in various ways the anomalously high response of local spending to grants relative 
to the response to private income – the so-called flypaper effect by which money from 
central government sticks where it hits – only some recent papers have explored the 
potential impact of TELs on the sensitivity of local public spending to exogenous variations 
in grants. Lutz (2010) conjectures that previous evidence of a flypaper effect might have 
arisen from state constraints preventing local governments from selecting their preferred 
bundle of public goods, and provides evidence of equivalence between grants and income 
from a school finance reform in New Hampshire, one of only five states with no state-
imposed limitations on the taxing or spending power of local governments (Lutz, 2010: p. 
317). 
Brooks and Phillips (2010) offer the first formal statement and explicit empirical test of the 
hypothesis that restrictive fiscal institutions might be responsible for the flypaper effect. 
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They use data on the US Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program and 
argue that state TELs may systematically force city governments to underprovide local 
public goods and increase the stimulative effect of federal grants on city spending. 
However, since they do not observe either the municipal tax bundle or whether a revenue 
raising constraint is actually binding in any given city, they have to rely on a state-level 
index of fiscal constraints and ignore both the municipal choice as to own revenue source 
diversification and the issue of endogenous selection of a city government into the fiscally 
constrained status. Interestingly, Brooks and Phillips (2010) find a generally high 
sensitivity of spending to grants in a period of dramatic retrenchment, while they find only 
limited evidence of an effect of statutory state-level tax limitations on municipal 
governments’ response to the collapse in CDBG grants. 
Baicker (2001) analyzes US states’ responses to federally mandated increases in public 
medical spending (mandated expansions in Medicaid coverage). She develops a theoretical 
model showing that states subject to binding tax limits (legal ceilings) would have to 
reduce spending on other programs by more when faced with a mandatory spending 
increase than they would if they were able to raise taxes. While her empirical analysis 
reveals that all states - with or without limits - offset the mandated Medicaid increase by 
reducing other public welfare spending, she recognizes that this might be due to the fact 
that she does not observe whether tax limits are actually binding. 
Finally, Revelli (2010) models the local tax mix determination process in the presence of 
statewide tax limitations and shows how the so-called flypaper effect arises in the 
endogenously generated constrained tax mix. In particular, local expenditures are shown to 
be predicted to display a one-for-one response to grants in the presence of binding 
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limitations on all local tax revenue sources. Revelli (2010) shows theoretically that a 
binding cap on just one of the available own revenue sources is enough to generate some 
form of flypaper effect, in the sense of an excess sensitivity of local public spending to 
grants, and the above result holds when either upper or lower tax limitations are binding: in 
fact, local authorities will display an excess sensitivity of public expenditures to grants 
irrespective of whether they are against lower or upper bounds. Finally, the reaction of local 
public spending to own tax base shocks will be a function of the (lower or upper) binding 
tax rate limits. By means of an empirical application to panel data on Italian local 
governments’ budgets, where local authorities are subject to strict and frequently binding 
upper and lower tax rate limitations, Revelli (2010) shows that authorities that are not fully 
constrained turn out to be able to smooth out their expenditure profile by offsetting state 
grant policy through own tax changes, and that the impact of own tax bases on local 
expenditures depends on whether lower or upper limits are binding in the observed tax mix. 
In addition, the empirical analysis that allows for endogenous selection into the tax-
constrained regime and grant endogeneity offers evidence of excess sensitivity of local 
public spending to grants, a one-for-one response, in tax-constrained localities, irrespective 
of whether upper or lower limits bind. 
An important corollary of Revelli (2010)’s analysis concerns the very interpretation of the 
public spending behavior that is conventionally known as the flypaper effect. Since excess 
sensitivity of local public spending to grants should be predicted to arise, and generally 
tends to manifest itself, both when grants increase and when they decrease, the flypaper 
effect label turns out to be a misleading one: an higher sensitivity of local public 
expenditures to grants than to own revenue sources cannot in general be interpreted as a 
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sinister symptom of decentralized government overspending. 
 
4.3 Tax limits and fiscal competition 
Some recent research has instead investigated the consequences of TELs on the spatial 
pattern of local fiscal policies. In the past two decades, public economists have increasingly 
employed spatial econometrics techniques to investigate the phenomenon of horizontal and 
vertical competition among governments in multi-tiered public sector structures. The use of 
geographical concepts and methods in empirical work on fiscal federalism – ‘geografiscal 
federalism’ (Revelli, 2013) – is justified by the idea that space is an important aspect of 
multi-tiered fiscal arrangements, as witnessed by the plethora of theoretical work based on 
the two most prominent spatial concepts in public economics (Oates’ decentralization 
theorem and the Tiebout sorting mechanism) as well as by the common finding that 
decentralized fiscal policies tend to exhibit positive spatial autocorrelation. 
Explicit incorporation of TELs in the specification and estimation of fiscal reaction 
functions seems warranted by the fact that local governments around the world are, as 
shown above, frequently subject to stringent regulations on their tax and spending 
decisions, making the ideal paradigm of unleashed intergovernmental competition sort of 
blurred in practice. In particular, if a local government hits a tax limit, a corner solution 
model accounting for clustering at the limit seems necessary when empirically investigating 
fiscal competition phenomena. Overlooking the fact that a number of local authorities 
might be constrained at the limit is bound to lead to similar problems as the ones that are 
encountered  in non-spatial econometric settings when the dependent variable is limited. In 
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particular, estimates of the reaction function slope will tend to be biased. Intuitively, 
authorities hitting the limits give the false impression of deliberately setting their policies 
independently of their competitors (in either tax or yardstick competition frameworks), 
while being in reality constrained by fiscal limitations to do so. 
Luna et al. (2007) examine Tennessee counties’ option sales taxes between 1975 and 1999, 
with county tax rates being legally constrained by a state cap of 2.25% in the 1975-1984 
window, and of 2.75% in the rest of the period. They show that county sales tax rates 
generally increased over time, with all 95 counties having positive tax rates and about half 
of them being capped at the maximum rate in 1984, and about 20% of them reaching the 
higher bound by 1999. To examine the role of economic and political factors in the decision 
to raise sales tax rates and eventually end up against the tax limit, they use a duration model 
that uses as the key variable the spell of time spent below the tax cap. To allow for 
neighborhood influences on the probability that a county ends in the corner solution, they 
use two variables. The first is the average sales tax rate of contiguous counties weighted by 
population, based on the assumption that larger neighboring counties are more likely to 
have an impact on the county’s tax rate. The second is a dummy variable that takes a value 
of one for a border county and a value of zero for an interior county, with the expectation 
that border counties will keep their local tax rates low to limit cross-border shopping arising 
from combined state and local sales tax differentials. While their survival analysis does not 
reveal any significant influence from neighboring counties, they acknowledge the 
complexity of a simultaneous spatial tax competition empirical model and call for further 
research in this area. 
Wu and Merriman (2011) use the introduction of a simplified local telecommunications tax 
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in Illinois in 2003 to examine municipalities’ tax setting choices in the subsequent years. 
The new system allowed municipalities to choose a tax rate between 0 and 6 percent of the 
gross charge for telecommunications purchased at retail. Between 2003 and 2008, the 
number of municipalities that did not set the tax dropped slightly, while the number of 
municipalities that were capped at the top rate increased significantly. When analyzing the 
determinants of the evolution of those tax rates over time, they find evidence of inertia 
effects in the sense that municipalities that had a zero tax rate at the time of introduction of 
the tax tended not to set positive tax rates subsequently, and the municipalities that were 
capped at the maximum rate tended not to revert from there. They do find evidence of 
neighboring effects, though: once allowing for inertial behavior of corner solution 
authorities, high or increasing tax rates in adjacent municipalities are estimated to make 
own tax increases more likely. 
Di Porto and Revelli (2013) explicitly model a spatial process in local tax policies in the 
presence of centrally imposed fiscal limitations. In order to investigate the effect of those 
limitations on the intensity of intergovernmental competition, they take the conventional 
empirical model of the fiscal reaction function (the spatial lag specification that does not 
account for corner solutions at the tax limits) as the benchmark, and implement three 
empirical approaches to the analysis of spatially dependent limited tax policies: 1) a 
Bayesian spatial approach for censored dependent variables; 2) a Tobit corner solution 
model augmented with a spatial lag; 3) a spatial discrete hazard model focusing on the 
corner solution outcomes. Based on an empirical application to provincial vehicle taxation 
in Italy, they find that explicitly allowing for corner solutions generated by tax limitations 
unveils a significantly stronger spatial dependence process than when employing 
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conventional approaches. They also show that the performance and usefulness of those 
modeling approaches depend on their ability to capture the specific features of the 
institutional framework under consideration, the nature of the state-local government 
structure and the binding intensity of the tax limitations in force. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Comprehension of the genesis and consequences of tax and expenditure limitations on local 
governments in multi-tiered structures of government represents an important challenge for 
scholars in law and economics investigating the extent to which typical democratic rules 
can limit the discretion or abuse of elected representatives. This chapter has first 
categorized the observed restrictive fiscal institutions into three main forms (bottom-up, 
top-down and self-imposed) according to the nature of the process (participatory, 
hierarchical, or self-disciplining) by which they were originated, and next reviewed the 
theoretical explanations for the existence of those various forms of limitations on local 
governments’ tax policies, discussing in particular the recent revival of theoretical research 
in this area after the early and somewhat disputable contributions relying on the 
imperfections of the political representation process and the inability of taxpayers to 
effectively monitor and control the growth of the public sector.  I have then discussed the 
empirical evidence on the impact of TELs on a number of aspects of decentralized policy-
making, showing that they often fail to achieve their stated objectives in terms of 
expenditure, taxation or overall local government growth, yet they substantially alter the 
behavior of lower-level governments in far from predictable ways, particularly as they 
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interfere with the process of inter-governmental competition that has long been considered 
a key ingredient for bringing efficiency into the local public sector, and may significantly 
alter the sensitivity of local public expenditures to state grants – a long-studied yet little 
understood empirical phenomenon in inter-governmental fiscal relationships. 
In the most recent years, and particularly after the financial crisis and global recession of 
the late 2000s, the role of top-down limitations on taxation and spending powers has grown 
considerably in most OECD countries: on one hand, EU member states have increasingly 
renounced sovereignty over fiscal matters, leaving little leeway to national policy-makers to 
select their desired fiscal policies in an attempt to smooth out public revenues and 
expenditures over the business cycle. On the other hand, regional and local governments 
within most EU states have been losing much of the fiscal autonomy they had achieved 
during the 1980s and 1990s. Admittedly, the fiscal decentralization reforms that occurred 
during the 1990s in several western democracies largely failed to attain their stated 
objectives: the accumulation of sometimes exceedingly large local debts and widespread 
episodes of local corruption and malpractice are hard to reconcile with the alleged benefits 
of fiscal federalism in terms of transparency, probity and accountability. In a way, the 
recent process of renewed fiscal centralization following the sovereign debt crisis burst 
opens the possibility for a novel scenario of inter-governmental fiscal relationships in a 
context of hierarchical fiscal limitation rules within tighter than ever local budget 
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